

Sovereignty, Migration and Mobility

A Play in Three Acts*

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Three Acts

- **Sovereignty: A lesson in political theory?**
- **Migration: A lesson in political economy.**
- **Migration and Mobility: A lesson in history**
- **Argument: emerging Migration State, solving the liberal paradox.**



Act One: Sovereignty

- ❑ Lesson in Political Theory
- ❑ Cornerstone of the international system
- ❑ Peace of Westphalia, Hobbes, Bodin, etc.
- ❑ All about AUTHORITY, monopoly of legitimate use of force, Weber
- ❑ Also about CONTROL, territory, population
- ❑ Organized hypocrisy, S. Krasner



Profoundly Liberal Concept

- ❑ Control of borders is the *sine qua non* of sovereignty
- ❑ Defining the *demos*
- ❑ Protecting the social contract
- ❑ But liberalism also celebrates the free, rational individual
- ❑ First hints of the liberal paradox
- ❑ Clash between rights of individual and state



Liberal Paradox

- **Logic of the Liberal State: economically open but politically closed.**
- **Liberalism would seem to dictate openness, greater mobility, free movement**
- **Evolution of institutions of sovereignty, nationality and citizenship**



Act Two: Migration

- A Lesson in Political Economy
- Migration: mirror image of trade politically
- Wealthier states push for closure/control for political and security reasons
- Poorer states push for openness for social and economic reasons
- Divergent interests: Coordination problems

Trade


- Mirror image of migration politically
- Wealthy states push for greater openness
- Poorer states push for greater closure
- A strict factor-cost, factor proportions and intensity logic—Phil Martin...
- A tale of two centuries—19th and 20th



Dawning of a Neo-liberal Age

- More or less continuous increase in exchange since 1945
- Volume of trade, propelled by GATT/WTO—logic of comparative advantage
- Volume of FDI and finance, facilitated by IMF, World Bank—liquidity and exchange rate stability.
- Increased migration and mobility—no regime and no organizing principles?


World Migration Trends



World Migration by Region

| Region | 1965 | 1975 | 1985 | 1990 | 1994 | 2000 | 2005 | % '94/'05 |
|---|-------------|-------------|--------------|--------------|-------------|--------------|--------------|-----------|
| Developed Countries | 30.3 | 38.2 | 47.8 | 54.1 | 56.7 | 104.1 | 115.4 | 4.9/9.5 |
| <i>North America</i> | 12.6 | 15 | 20.4 | 23.9 | 25 | 40.8 | 44.5 | 8.5/13.5 |
| Refugees | -- | -- | -- | -- | 0.7 | 0.6 | 0.6 | |
| <i>Europe</i> | 14.6 | 19.4 | 22.8 | 24.9 | 26.1 | 56.1 | 64.1 | 3.6/8.8 |
| Eastern Europe | | | | | | 24.8 | 22.4 | /7.5 |
| Western Europe | | | | | | 18.8 | 22.1 | /11.9 |
| refugees/Europe | | | | | 1.9 | 2.3 | 2.1 | |
| East Asia | 3 | 3.8 | 4.6 | 5.3 | 5.6 | 5.8 | 6.5 | 1.6/1.4 |
| refugees | | | | | 0.05 | -- | 0.3 | |
| LDCs | 44.9 | 46.2 | 57.2 | 65.6 | 68.4 | 70.8 | 85.6 | |
| <i>Africa</i> | 6.9 | 10.1 | 10.3 | 13.6 | 14.3 | 16.3 | 17.1 | 2.5/1.9 |
| refugees | | | | | 6.8 | -- | 3 | |
| <i>Latin America</i> | 5.9 | 5.7 | 6.5 | 7.5 | 7.9 | 5.9 | 6.6 | 1.6/1.2 |
| refugees | | | | | 0.01 | 0.02 | 0.04 | |
| <i>Mid-East, South and Southeast Asia</i> | 31.6 | 29.8 | 39.7 | 43.8 | 45.9 | 44.1 | 46.9 | |
| refugees | | | | | 5 | -- | 7.5 | |
| <i>Oceania</i> | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.2 | 0.3 | 0.3 | 5.8 | 5.3 | |
| refugees | | | | | 0.05 | -- | 0.08 | |
| World Total | 75.2 | 84.4 | 105.5 | 119.6 | 125 | 175 | 190.6 | 2.2/2.9 |
| refugees | | | | | 14.5 | 15.9 | 13.5 | |

U.S., Europe take in majority of world's immigrants (net immigration by country)





Globalization Thesis

- Rise of transnational actors: TNCs, transnational communities—Sassen
- Weakening, redefining of state sovereignty/authority—losing control?
- Post-national citizenship, new human rights regimes.
- Locus of power and change in society and economy—not the state.
- Would seem to account well for high levels of exchange, including migration.



Liberal Institutionalism

- Heavily rationalist—define migration as a “global public good.”
- But unlike trade and finance, no need/demand for international policy governing migration.
- Unlimited supply of labor
- Managed unilaterally and bilaterally through guestworker schemes, etc.



Predictions of Liberal Institutionalism

- Need for institutions/rules to sustain openness.
- Interdependence also drives openness, reducing risks. Coalitional argument
- Problem is that trade follows this logic much better than migration.
- Groups/individuals more likely to pursue market interests in area of trade than in migration.
- Migration touches on issues of identity and raises issues of societal security (Rudolph).



Political Economy of Migration

- Three factors (difficult to measure) in building open migration coalitions.
- First of these is cultural or ideational—identity politics—Same Huntington, WHO ARE WE? National/founding myths are important.
- Second is economic—Gary Freeman’s clientelist politics—privileged position of business—Bill Gates, California growers, etc.
- Third and most important factor is legal (rights, status). “We asked for workers, but people came instead,” Max Frisch. People are not shirts!

The Missing Regime and the Coordination Problem

- Following Ruggie, three tenets of multilateralism:
- Indivisibility—the object of regulation should take the form of a public good.
- Norms of conduct/principles around which actor expectations converge.
- Diffuse reciprocity—respect for the rules of the game.
- Can migration control be defined as an international public good?

Asymmetries and Tradeoffs

- ❑ Interests of OECD states and LDCs with respect to migration are divergent.
- ❑ OECD states still trapped in the liberal paradox—economic logic of openness but political/legal logic of closure.
- ❑ Rights-Markets tradeoff?
- ❑ Guestworker programs seem to be a way to finesse this tradeoff.



Limits of Control

- Unilateral regulation of migration, closing borders, undermines the liberal order.
- Rolling back rights is difficult to do—they have a long half life.
- Regional regimes might be a possibility, if asymmetries are manageable—EU, Rabat?
- Problem remains: how to define migration as an international public good.
- Figure 1 illustrates the problem.

A Typology of International Regimes

| | | Institutions | |
|-----------------|--------|--|-------------------------------|
| | | WEAK | STRONG |
| MULTILATERALISM | STRONG | Refugees and Political Asylum (UNHCR) | Finance (IMF & World Bank) |
| | WEAK | International Labor Migration (ILO and IOM) | Trade (GATT or WTO) |

Alternatives to Multilateral Regime

- ❑ Centralization of regulatory authority: EU?
- ❑ Suasion or tactical issue linkage (Susan Martin).
- ❑ Need for a dominant strategy, best practices—orderly movement, liberty under law.
- ❑ Tactical issue linkage—ODA tied to migration control—Sevilla.
- ❑ UN Global Commission—Michael Doyle.
- ❑ Chances for any of these strategies to work are small, given asymmetries in the IPE.
- ❑ Thrown back on national state—migration state?

Act Three: Mobility

- **A lesson in history**
- **GARRISON STATE—17th century security logic, reinforces sovereignty, post-9/11**
- **TRADING STATE—19th century economic logic**
- **MIGRATION STATE—20th century, post-1945 security, economic, and RIGHTS logic**



Emerging Migration State?

- ❑ **Canada (Migration and Integration)**
- ❑ **Philippines (Circular Migration/Mobility)**
- ❑ **EU (Solving the Liberal Paradox?)**
- ❑ **UAE v. USA, rights-markets tradeoff**
- ❑ **No, rights are key to regulating migration**

Conclusion: Liberal Retrenchment?

- Global Financial Crisis
- Need for states to sustain markets
- To paraphrase Karl Polanyi, without the “continuous, centrally organized, and controlled intervention” of the most powerful liberal states, the “simple and natural liberty” of the global economy will not survive.